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mark of McDonald’s.
2 Rogoff (1995) presents a thor-
ough survey of recent research
on PPP.
3 As an example of the former,
see Sapsford (1993); of the
latter, see Cumby (1995).
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he theory of Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) has a long and venerable tradi-
tion in international economics.
Fundamentally, the theory states that
prices of identical goods in different coun-
tries should be equal after adjusting for the
rate of exchange between currencies.  As a
theoretical proposition, PPP serves as a solid
foundation for thinking about the condi-
tions under which prices in international
markets adjust to attain long-term equilib-
rium.  As an empirical matter, however,
PPP has been a more elusive concept.2
 
The Economist has established another,
though somewhat more recent, tradition: the
Big Mac standard.  Since 1986, The Econo-
mist has published yearly tongue-in-cheek
comparisons of the prices of McDonald’s
Big Mac sandwich in various countries
around the world, evaluating prevailing
exchange rates on the basis of these price
differentials.  A similar index has also been
developed by the Union Bank of Switzerland
in its annual comparison of prices and
incomes around the globe.  These light-
hearted studies of international hamburger
prices have predictably whet the appetites
of the popular media and the ﬁnancial press
and have even given serious scholars food
for thought.3
The attractive feature of the Big Mac as
an indicator of PPP is its uniform composi-
tion.  With few exceptions, the component
ingredients of the Big Mac are the same
everywhere around the globe.  (See the
shaded insert, “A Big Mac Is a Big Mac Is a
Big Mac?”)  For that reason, the Big Mac
serves as a convenient market basket of
goods with which the purchasing power of
different currencies can be compared.
Just as is the case with broader
measures, however, the Big Mac standard
fails to meet the demanding tests of PPP .
In this article, we review the fundamental
theory of PPP and describe some of the
reasons why it might not be expected to
hold as a practical matter.  Throughout, 
we use the Big Mac data as an illustrative
example.  In the process, we also shed
some light on the value of the Big Mac
sandwich as a palatable measure of PPP .
THE LAW OF ONE PRICE
AND PURCHASING POWER
PARITY
A strong version of the purchasing
power parity theory has as its foundation
the law of one price. Abstracting from
complicating factors such as transportation
costs, taxes, and tariffs, the law of one price
states that the price of any particular good
that is traded on world markets will be 
the same price in every country engaged 
in trade.  
For instance, consider the price of
sesame seeds—one of the basic ingredients
of the Big Mac—in Britain and the United
States.  Letting p£
ss and p$
ss represent the
prices of sesame seeds in Britain (in pounds)
and the United States (in dollars), respec-







where e is the pound/dollar exchange rate.
If sesame seeds cost $6 per bushel in the
United States and the pound/dollar exchange
rate is 0.5, then the law of one price states
that the price of sesame seeds in Britain
should be £3.  If sesame seeds sold for a
price higher than £3, an astute trader
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could buy sesame seeds in the United
States and sell them in Britain at a proﬁt.
This type of activity—known as arbitrage—
would tend to drive the price of sesame
seeds higher in the United States and lower
in Britain, with the process continuing
until the law of one price prevailed.
 
Absolute Purchasing Power Parity
The law of one price generalizes to
PPP under special circumstances.
Consider price indexes (consumer price
indexes, for example) for the United States
and Britain, which are constructed by
combining the prices of several different
A BIG MAC IS A BIG MAC IS A BIG MAC?
At the close of 1995 it was possible to enjoy a Big Mac in more than 80 countries
around the world.  In each of these countries, the Big Mac is generally made according
to the same recipe.  However, there are some things that make a Big Mac unique to each
country.  First is the name itself.  Though in most countries a Big Mac is known as a
Big Mac, in China it is called a Juwuba, meaning “big with no equal,” a reference to a
popular Chinese Transformer toy hero.  In Russia the Big Mac is known as a Beeg Mek
Gamburger.  (Since there is no equivalent of the letter h in the Russian alphabet, all 
foreign words with h are pronounced as if the letter were a g.)  In Japan it is a 
Biggu Macku.  
In Israel the Big Mac is made with kosher meat, even though the inclusion of
cheese in the recipe makes it a nonkosher sandwich.  According to the McDonald’s
franchiser in Israel, most Israelis prefer to eat kosher meat even when their meals are
nonkosher.1 In Islamic countries, the menu is halal in accordance with Islamic law.
The McDonald’s slated to open in India this year will not serve beef products in keep-
ing with local practice.  Thus the Big Mac is likely to be a vegetable or chicken burger.
Even when the sandwich tastes the same, the experience of eating a Big Mac in a
foreign country may differ greatly from the typical U.S. experience.  In Beijing and
Moscow, eating a Big Mac is certainly not a solitary endeavor.  Each city has a McDonald’s
with 700 seats and nearly 30 registers.  Despite the grand scale in Moscow, a wait time
of 40 to 45 minutes is still common.  Patrons have been known to purchase Big Macs
(and other McDonald’s favorites) and resell them at a proﬁt to those waiting in line.  
To limit this secondary market, customers are prohibited from purchasing more than
10 Big Macs per person. 
McDonald’s has a policy of trying to get locally as many of its supplies as possible.
In part, this is because of the import restrictions it faces.  Thus, for example, although
McDonald’s claimed that the quality of the french fries produced by the local monopo-
list in Israel did not meet its standards, it was prohibited from importing french fries.
So, McDonald’s built its own french fry factory in Israel to supply its restaurants.  In
China McDonald’s developed a new potato strain because it was unable to ﬁnd a good
local substitute for Idaho potatoes.
Though McDonald’s generally relies on subcontractors to process much of the food
it uses, in Russia it was forced to build its own processing plant to ensure the adequacy
and quality of supplies for its restaurant.  Moreover McDonald’s also bought its own
ﬂeet of trucks to avoid the poor distribution system in Russia.  With the breakdown of
the Soviet system and increased privatization, McDonald’s is now ﬁnding some local
Russian businesses that can process some of its food items cheaper than it can while
maintaining its quality standards.  Thus, for example, it no longer processes cucumbers
into pickles, but relies on a subcontractor to do this.
1 Curtius (1995).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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commodities.  Typically, these indexes are
weighted averages of the individual prices.
If the same goods are included in each index
and if the price indexes are constructed
identically, then the overall price levels 
P$ and P£ will be related in the same way
as each of the  individual commodities
according to the law of one price:
(2) P* = e 3 P$,
where P* is the price level measured in the
foreign currency and e is the exchange rate
relative to the dollar (foreign currency
units per dollar).  
The conditions under which the law 
of one price generalizes to yield PPP—as
summarized in equation 2—are clearly quite
restrictive.  In particular, because price
indexes are weighted averages of individual
prices, the law of one price will directly imply
PPP only if the same goods are included
and if the same weighting scheme is used
to construct the indexes for different coun-
tries.  Usually, these weights are based on
actual consumption or production shares.
So, for example, if more beef per capita is
consumed in Britain and more pickles per
capita are consumed in the United States,
then the price of beef will  be relatively more
important in a British price index, whereas
the price of pickles will be more important
in a U.S. index.  Even if beef and pickle prices
are always identical in the two countries, a
rise in the world price of beef will have a
larger effect on the British price index than
on the U.S. index.
Consequently, testing the absolute ver-
sion of PPP requires careful construction
of price indexes so that a common market
basket of goods is measured.  One example
of such a comparison is embodied in the
data set known as the Penn World Table
(PWT), which is based on the United
Nations International Comparisons Program
[see Summers and Heston (1991)].4 The
PWT presents price measures that are based
on a common market basket of approximately
150 detailed categories of goods.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 shows a
measure of PPP for various countries (rela-
tive to the United States) based on data
from the PWT for 1991.  The PWT reports
price data in dollars, P*/e, and from equa-
tion 2 we have (1/e)3(P*/P$) = 1.  The
ﬁgures reported in Table 1 are constructed
as [(1/e)3(P*/P$)]3100, so a value  greater
than 100 means that dollar-equivalent prices
in the country under consideration are higher
Table 1
Indicators of Purchasing Power Parity (1991)
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40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200than prices in the United States.  We can
interpret this as the U.S. dollar having a
lower purchasing power in that country
relative to the United States or as the local
currency being overvalued relative to the
dollar .  A value of less than 100 indicates
that dollar-equivalent prices are lower than
prices in the United States—the local cur-
rency is undervalued.5 Clearly, absolute
PPP does not hold strictly for the currencies
of countries reported in Table 1.
Another collection of commodities that
is common across countries is the ingredi-
ents of the Big Mac sandwich.  Sold in more
than 80 countries around the world, the
Big Mac is a standardized bundle of goods.
Most of the ingredients that go into a Big
Mac are individually traded on international
markets, so we might expect that the law
of one price would hold, at least approxi-
mately.  (See the shaded insert, “A New
Jingle?”)  The second column of Table 1
shows measures of PPP based on Big Mac
prices.  Note that a similar pattern emerges
for the Big Mac measure as for the PWT
measure of PPP .  The correlation between
these two price measures is 0.85, and of
the 15 countries shown in Table 1 there is
only one country (Canada) for which the
two price measures indicate differing quali-
tative conclusions regarding overvaluation
or undervaluation.  The close relationship
between PWT price indexes and Big Mac
prices is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.
A total of 200 individual observations,
collected over the 10-year period 1986-95,
are available from The Economist Big Mac
surveys. (PPP data for all of these observa-
tions are reported in Table A1 on p. 19).
Among these observations only 6.5 percent
show deviations of 5 percent or less from
PPP , and only 15.5 percent of the observa-
tions show deviations of 10 percent or less.
These statistics indicate that for most obser-
vations there are signiﬁcant deviations
from PPP .  For example, the data indicate
that in 1995 the yen was overvalued by
100 percent against the U.S. dollar, whereas
the Swiss franc was overvalued by 125 per-
cent against the dollar.  In contrast, in
1995 the Chinese yuan was undervalued
by 55 percent against the U.S. dollar and
the Hong Kong dollar was undervalued by
47 percent relative to the U.S. dollar.
Figure 2 provides a graphical analysis
of absolute PPP over time for selected
countries, comparing actual exchange
rates (relative to the U.S. dollar) with the
ratio of countries’ Big Mac prices relative
to Big Mac prices in the United States.  An
overvalued currency is one for which the
Big Mac price ratio (P*/P$) exceeds the
exchange rate (e).
Figure 2 demonstrates not only that
departures from PPP are common, but also
that for most currencies the direction of the
deviation is maintained throughout the
sample period.  For example,  the Australian
dollar, the Hungarian forint, and the Hong
Kong dollar have all been consistently under-
valued, whereas the German mark, the
Japanese yen, the South Korean won, and
the Swedish krona have been consistently
overvalued against the U.S. dollar.  
Moreover, it is not obvious that there
is a tendency for deviations from PPP to
dampen over time.6 Two notable cases in
which the deviations have persisted or
increased are the Hong Kong dollar and
the Hungarian forint.  The Japanese yen
showed some movement toward parity
with the dollar from 1988 to 1990 but has
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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overvalued and
undervalued are used here in a
strictly descriptive sense, not to
imply that exchange rates are,
in some sense, wrong.
6 In his econometric study of PPP
using the Big Mac price data,
Cumby (1995) found statistical
evidence that deviations from
PPP are, in fact, temporary.
Additionally, he found that the
adjustment toward PPP tends
to take place through local cur-




To aﬁcionados of classic television commercials, the
ingredients of a Big Mac sandwich are indelibly etched into
memory in the form of a jingle.  In terms of the United
Nations’ Standard International Trade Classiﬁcations
(SITC), the jingle might sound a little different:
Ingredient SITC Code SITC Description
All-beef patties 01122 Meat of bovine animals, boneless, frozen
Special sauce 09849 Sauces and preparations, not elsewhere speciﬁed
(NES), mixed condiments, and  seasonings
Lettuce 05454 Lettuce and chicory, fresh or chilled   
Cheese 02420 Processed cheese, not grated or powdered
Pickles 05456 Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled
Onions 05451 Onions and shallots, fresh or chilled
Sesame-seed bun 04849 Bakers’ wares, NES
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Absolute Purchasing Power Parity
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be expressed as ∆ ln(e) =
∆ ln(P*) – ∆ ln(P
$).  This for-
mula and equation 3 will pro-
duce the same results for small
percentage changes.  The rela-
tive PPP data discussed here
and reported in Table A2 on p.
20 are calculated using log
changes.
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moved further away from parity in each
year since.  The Irish punt is the one cur-
rency for which there is clear evidence 
of a continuing movement back to parity
following deviations.
Throughout this article, we evaluate
PPP relationships between foreign curren-
cies and the U.S. dollar.  Conceptually,
however, the data presented in Table A1
(p.19) can be used to determine whether
or not PPP holds between any two curren-
cies.  As an example, the shaded insert,
“The Big Mac and the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism,” discusses PPP relation-
ships using the German mark as the 
base currency. 
Relative PPP
Given the difﬁculties with constructing
appropriate market baskets for testing
absolute PPP , a weaker version of the
theory is often considered.  This relative
version of PPP states that changes in price
levels will be related to changes in
exchange rates.  Speciﬁcally, equation 2
can be transformed to express a relationship
in growth rates as follows7:
(3) %De = %DP*–%DP$.
Equation 3 says that the percentage
change in the exchange rate between two
countries is equal to the difference in their
inﬂation rates.  For example, if U.S. inﬂa-
tion is 5 percent a year while inﬂation in
Britain is 3 percent a year, then the relative
version of PPP states that the dollar will
depreciate by 2 percent a year.  Relative
PPP is a less strict condition than absolute
PPP , requiring only that deviations from
PPP not worsen. 
Measures of relative PPP in relation to
the U.S. dollar are presented in Table A2
(p. 20).  These measures are summarized
for the currencies of selected countries in
Figure 3, which shows a measure of the
difference between the Big Mac inﬂation
differential  (%∆ P*–%∆ P$) and the change
in the exchange rate (%∆ e).  We would not
necessarily think that relative PPP would
hold on a year-to-year basis, but is more
likely to be observable in terms of an average
relationship over many years.  Consequently,
relative PPP is suggested by the measures
shown in Figure 3 whenever the spread
between the inﬂation differential and the
exchange rate change tends to center on
zero, rather than to exhibit persistent devi-
ations away from zero.  For several countries,
this appears to be the case.  For example,
the currencies of Hong Kong and South
Korea both appear to have approximately
maintained relative PPP against the dollar
since 1991—despite the fact that absolute
PPP clearly has not held for either of these
currencies (see Figure 2).  On the other
hand, the Japanese yen has shown little
evidence of maintaining even relative PPP
against the dollar.
As a long-run test, relative PPP is
somewhat difﬁcult to evaluate for the Big
Mac because data are limited for many
countries and there are only a few years of
observations.  The data suggest, however,
Figure 3
Relative Purchasing Power Parity:
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THE BIG MAC AND THE EUROPEAN EXCHANGE RATE
MECHANISM
The ﬁgure to the right
presents PPP information for
the currencies in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the European
Monetary System relative to
the German mark.  The upper
panel shows the PPP behavior
of the currencies at the core
of the ERM, and the lower
panel considers the weaker
currencies in the ERM.  Once
again, there are substantial
persistent deviations from
absolute PPP .  In general, the
core currencies have been
overvalued relative to the
mark.  The Dutch guilder has
been closest to parity over
most of the sample period,
and the Danish kroner has
been the most overvalued of
the four currencies.  The
1995 PPP index numbers for
the core currencies, with the
exception of the Danish kro-
ner, lie within the ﬂuctuation
bands permitted under the
ERM.
As one would expect, the
core currencies have been closer to parity with the mark than the weak currencies
(again with the exception of the Danish kroner).  The lower panel shows that before its
October 1990 entry into the ERM, the pound was undervalued against the mark.
During the two years (1991-92) in the sample in which the pound was a member of the
ERM, it was overvalued against the mark.  However, initially following its September
1992 withdrawal from the ERM, the pound moved closer to parity with the mark.  The
Big Mac index thus lends support to those who have argued that the pound entered the
ERM at too high an exchange rate (DM/£).  The Spanish peseta (which entered the
ERM in  June 1989) and the Italian lira were also overvalued before 1993.  Thus this
ﬁgure provides some explanation as to why these currencies came under attack within
the ERM.  Even more striking is the sharp undervaluation of the pound, the lira, and
the peseta that have occurred since 1992.  All three currencies now are undervalued by
nearly 20 percent or more against the mark.
Though PPP theory may explain some of the tension within the ERM that arose in
1992-93, it cannot explain why the Irish punt came under pressure because on a PPP
basis the punt has been undervalued against the mark.  This undervaluation was made
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that PPP does not generally hold in the short
run, for either the absolute or the relative
versions of the theory (see Tables A1 and
A2).  Furthermore, for many currencies,
deviations from PPP against the U.S. dollar
appear to be sustained over a period of
several years.  The next section provides
some explanations for these deviations
from PPP . 
WHY DOES PPP FAIL?
In 1994 it cost $2.30 to buy a Big Mac
in the United States, $3.77 to buy a Big
Mac in Japan, and $1.66 to buy a Big Mac
in Hungary.  Thus a Big Mac devotee could
buy nearly one and two-thirds of the sand-
wiches in the United States for every one
he could purchase in Japan.  He could buy
less than three-quarters of a Big Mac in the
United States for every one he could enjoy
in Hungary.  
However, one wouldn’t expect Japanese
and U.S. consumers to import Big Macs from
Hungary to take advantage of the lower
prices—a Big Mac sandwich shipped halfway
across the globe would probably not arrive
in a very appetizing form.  Nevertheless,
because the components of a Big Mac are
traded on world markets, the law of one
price suggests that prices of the components
should be the same in all markets.  
If the Big Mac is no more than the sum
of its ingredients, then trade should
equalize the price of a Big Mac across bor-
ders; or at the least, differences between
prices should narrow over time.  Instead,
the dollar price of a Big Mac in the three
countries diverged by even more in 1995
than in 1994.  In 1995 it cost $1.58 to buy
a Big Mac in Hungary, $2.32 to buy a Big
Mac in the United States, and $4.65 to buy
a Big Mac in Japan. 
How do we explain these deviations
from PPP?  Once again, the Big Mac can
serve as a useful example of why there tend
to be systematic departures from PPP .  We
consider four main explanations: the exis-
tence of  barriers to trade, the inclusion of
non-traded elements in the cost of a Big Mac,
imperfect competition, and the existence
of current account imbalances.  
Barriers to Trade
One simple reason why PPP , at least in
the absolute sense, fails to hold is that it is
costly to ship goods across countries.  The
cost of shipping the sesame seeds needed
for the Big Mac buns may be minimal.
Shipping perishable ingredients such as
lettuce and beef is more costly.  Transporta-
tion costs therefore may drive a wedge
between the prices of the same good in 
different markets.
Suppose for example, that shipping
costs add $0.10 to the price of a Big Mac in
Japan relative to the price in the United
States.  In this case, though economists
would see as a violation of PPP a Big Mac
costing $2.30 in the United States and one
costing $2.40 in Japan, the difference in
price would not result in a movement of
Big Macs (or more appropriately the ingre-
dients of Big Macs) from the United States
to Japan.  Only if the prices of the Big Macs
in the two countries differed by more than
$0.10 would goods be shipped between
the countries to take advantage of price
differences.  As a result, we might expect
absolute PPP to hold only approximately,
with prices diverging within a range deter-
mined by the transport costs.8
A more important factor than the 
presence of natural barriers to trade is the
existence of tariffs and other legal restric-
tions on trade.  Nearly every country
restricts the importation of agricultural
goods through the use of tariffs and quotas
in order to protect its domestic farm sector.
Tariffs, which represent a tax on imported
goods, and quotas, which limit the amount
of a good that can be imported, both raise
the price of agricultural imports.  
In one of the early works on PPP ,
Cassel (1921) noted the effects of trade
restrictions, stating, “If trade between two
countries is more hampered in one direction
than in the other, the value of the money
of the country whose export is relatively
more restricted will fall, in the other
country, beneath the purchasing power
parity.”9 Cassel emphasized the effect of
export restrictions on PPP because these
restrictions were used extensively during
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1996
8 In a study of 14 OECD coun-
tries, Wei and Parsley (1995)
ﬁnd that transportation costs
are an important factor in devi-
ations from PPP.
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World War I.  He noted, however, that import
restrictions have the opposite effect.  Thus,
given two countries, the one with the greater
restrictions on imports will see its currency
overvalued on a PPP basis.  If there were
no other factors causing deviations from
PPP ,  the Big Mac data would tell us which
countries had high agricultural barriers to
trade relative to the United States.  That is,
countries with high barriers to trade rela-
tive to the United States would have
overvalued currencies relative to the dollar,
whereas those with lower trade barriers
than the United States would have under-
valued currencies.
Trade barriers may partly explain 
why the Korean won has been consistently
overvalued relative to the dollar on a PPP
basis.  Korea maintains high barriers to the
importation of beef, the key ingredient of a
Big Mac.  From 1989 through 1994 Korea
imposed a 30 percent tariff on beef imports
in addition to imposing quantitative
restrictions.  In 1995 Korea eliminated
quantitative restrictions on beef imports
but raised the tariff to 44.1 percent.  These
trade barriers place a signiﬁcant wedge
between the price of beef in world markets
and the domestic (Korean market) price of
beef.  Thus they could explain sustained
deviations from PPP .
One additional factor that may help
explain the deviations from PPP is tax 
differences across countries.  The Big Mac
prices reported by The Economist are inclu-
sive of taxes.  Thus, holding all other
factors constant, countries with higher
taxes on a Big Mac relative to the United
States would appear to have overvalued
currencies relative to the dollar.  Changes
in tax rates can also give rise to apparent
revaluations of Big Mac parities.  For
example, in 1991 Canada imposed the
Goods and Services Tax, a national 7 per-
cent sales tax.  Between 1990 and 1991,
the price of a Big Mac rose from C$2.19 
to C$2.35.  As a result, the Canadian
dollar moved from being  undervalued 
by 14 percent against the U.S. dollar to
being undervalued by only 9 percent.  
It would be misleading, however, to say
that the United States and Canada were
brought closer to PPP by the imposition 
of this new tax.
Non-traded Goods
According to the theory of PPP , if there
are no barriers to trade, then the dollar price
of a good should be the same in the United
States, Hungary, and Japan.  The price of a
Big Mac in any country, however, reﬂects
more than the price of its ingredients.  To
sell its products, McDonald’s has to buy or
lease space for a restaurant and purchase
utilities to heat, cool, and light the
restaurant, as well as to run everything
from the grills to the cash registers.  Real
estate and utilities are non-traded goods.
Though the title to a piece of property, for
example, can be traded, the location of the
property cannot be traded.  Thus although
it may be cheaper to rent space for a restau-
rant in Budapest than in St. Louis, it is
useless to do so if one wants to serve
customers lunch in St. Louis. To the extent
that rent and utilities determine the cost of a
Big Mac, deviations from PPP may simply
reﬂect these cost differences across
countries.
The price of a Big Mac also reﬂects a
service component—that is, the cost of
preparing  the Big Mac and serving the
customer.  These aspects require the use 
of workers, who in economic terminology
are also non-traded goods.  McDonald’s
workers, like all workers, are restricted in
their ability to move across borders to take
advantage of wage differentials.
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)
formalized the idea that non-traded goods
systematically affect the deviation from PPP .
They argued that because non-tradables
are included in price indexes (such as the
Big Mac index), high-income countries will
have overvalued currencies relative to low-
income countries.  This result is caused by
differences in productivity across countries
and sectors.  The Balassa-Samuelson argu-
ment is based on the idea, supported
empirically, that per capita income levels
broadly reﬂect differences in labor produc-
tivity.10 Thus high-income countries have
more productive labor forces than low-
10Kravis and Lipsey (1987 and
1988) have presented empiri-
cal evidence on the role of non-
traded goods in differences in
national price levels.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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income countries.  Furthermore, the differ-
ences in productivity are greatest 
in the traded goods sector.  The higher
productivity in traded goods in high-income
countries is reﬂected in higher wages in all
sectors and thus higher prices in the non-
tradable goods sector in these countries
relative to low-income countries.11 The
higher prices for non-tradable goods trans-
lates into higher price levels in high-income
countries.  Thus the currencies of these
countries will appear overvalued relative
to the currencies of low-income countries.
Turning to Big Macs, it is unlikely that
there are large differences in the productivity
of workers cooking burgers regardless of
whether they are working in China or the
United States.  There are, however, large
differences in the wages earned by these
workers.  For example, when McDonald’s
opened in China in 1992, the average
monthly pay for a full-time starting worker
was $60.12 A full-time starting worker at a
McDonald’s in the United States would
earn a minimum of $737 a month.13 This
difference in wage costs may partly explain
why the yuan has been consistently under-
valued against the dollar as measured by
Big Mac prices. 
In fact, according to the Balassa-
Samuelson theory, holding all other things
constant,  the dollar should be overvalued
against the currencies of  developing coun-
tries.  As illustrated in Table 2, the currencies
of developing countries and the countries
in transition (the former Communist
countries) have generally been undervalued
relative to the U.S. dollar.  Of the 15 devel-
oping country currencies in the sample,
there are only two that have been consistently
and signiﬁcantly overvalued:  the Argentine
peso and the South Korean won.14 The Big
Mac index indicated that the Mexican peso
was only slightly overvalued in 1994 but
became signiﬁcantly undervalued in
1995.15 With respect to the four transition
economies included in the sample, the
currencies of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland have all been consis-
tently undervalued relative to the U.S.
dollar and the Russian ruble has been
undervalued since 1992.  
In contrast, the currencies of other
industrial countries are generally overvalued
relative to the U.S. dollar, consistently so
against 13 of the 18 developed countries
listed in Table 2.  The British pound has
been overvalued in all years except 1988.
There are only three industrial countries
against whose currencies have shown con-
sistent evidence of undervaluation: the two
antipodean countries (Australia and New
Zealand) and Canada.  
More generally, we would expect 
to see a positive relationship between
price levels and per capita income when
comparing countries.  Figure 4 plots two
measures of this relationship.  The upper
panel uses the data from the PWT data set
for 1990 to compare PPP price levels with
11Competition for labor services
ensures that the higher wages
in the tradable goods sector (as
a result of higher productivity)
in high-income countries leads
to higher wages in the non-trad-
able goods sectors in those
countries.
12Driver (1992).
13Based on a minimum wage of
$4.25 per hour.
14On the basis of one observa-
tion, the dollar was signiﬁcantly
undervalued against the Israeli
shekel and the Venezuelan 
bolivar.
15The observation that the
Mexican peso was overvalued
in 1994 is based on data for
April.  It is possible that
between April 1994 and
December 1994, the peso
became even more overvalued
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Britian 1986-95 Over, Under (88)














Developing Countries and Countries in Transition
Undervaluation or Overvaluation
Country Data Period of Local Currency
Argentina 1992-95 Over
Brazil 1992-95 Under (92,94), Over (93,95)
Chile 1994-95 Parity (94), Over (95)
China 1992-95 Under
Czech Republic 1994-95 Under





Mexico 1993-95 Parity (93), Over(94), Under (95)
Poland 1994-95 Under
Russia 1990-95 Under, Over (90-91)
Singapore 1986,1988-92,1994-95 Under, Over (92)




Yugoslavia 1988-91 Undergross domestic product  [reproduced and
updated from Summers and Heston (1991)].
The lower panel presents a similar compar-
ison, plotting the hamburger prices  against
average net earnings for cities around the
world.16 As we might expect from a bundle
of goods that includes both tradable and
non-tradable components, the relationship
between Big Mac prices and incomes closely
parallels the relationship that exists for more
inclusive measures of the overall price level.
While the Balassa-Samuelson theory
may be useful in explaining deviations from
PPP between developed and developing
countries, it is less useful in explaining dif-
ferences across countries with more similar
per capita incomes.  Thus we would hesi-
tate to argue that the undervaluation of the
dollar against the currencies of most other
developed countries is reﬂective of more
productive labor forces in these countries
relative to the United States.17
Imperfect Competition
The inclusion of non-traded goods in
price indexes is often considered the primary
explanation for deviations from PPP .  This
is because in the absence of trade barriers,
which for most goods are not substantial,
the law of one price states that the price of
tradable goods will be the same in all
countries.  In recent years, however, econ-
omists have modiﬁed their thinking on the
equalization of tradable goods prices.  
Borrowing from models of price discrimi-
nation, some economists have argued that,
in the presence of imperfect competition,
traded goods prices may not be equal across
countries.  Such inequalities will result in
deviations from PPP .  Some economists
have argued that differences in tradable
goods prices account for much of the 
deviation from PPP .18
Differences in traded goods prices across
countries can occur if ﬁrms are able to price
to market—that is, charge different prices
in different countries.  Price discrimination
theory states that a ﬁrm will maximize
proﬁts by varying prices in accordance with
the elasticity of demand for a product.  The
elasticity of demand indicates how the
quantity demanded of a product changes
given a change in price.  If the price of 
a good increases by 10 percent and the
quantity demanded falls by less than 
10 percent, the demand for this product is
said to be inelastic.  If the price increases
by 10 percent and the quantity demanded
falls by more than 10 percent, the demand
for this product is elastic.  Sales revenue
rises following an increase in the price of a
good whose demand is inelastic and falls
following an increase in the price of a
product whose demand is elastic.  A price-
discriminating ﬁrm would be able to
maximize revenue by charging a higher
price for its product in a country where
demand is inelastic relative to a country
where demand is more elastic.
One way in which ﬁrms price to market
in international markets is by limiting
exchange rate pass-through.  Exchange
rate pass-through indicates what percent 
of a change in the exchange rate is passed
through to import prices.  If exchange rate
pass-through is complete, any change in
exchange rates will be reﬂected in the local
prices of imported goods.  Thus if
exchange rate pass-through was complete,
the 90 percent fall in the Mexican peso
against the dollar between 1994 and 1995
should have been reﬂected in a 90 percent
decline in the price of Mexican sesame
seeds sold in the United States.  Incomplete
exchange rate pass-through means that the
price of imported goods does not fall (rise)
by as much as the fall (rise)  in the value
of the foreign currency.  If exchange rate
pass-through is incomplete, then a wedge
occurs between the prices of the good in
the domestic and foreign markets.19
The ability of a ﬁrm to price to market
depends on the ease with which goods can
be resold across countries.  For example,
because of differences in safety and pollu-
tion standards, as well as warranty
restrictions, it is difﬁcult for individuals 
to resell automobiles across borders.  The
automobile market is one of the more
commonly cited examples of pricing-
to-market behavior.20
Clearly the Big Mac cannot be easily
resold across borders.  However, all of its
16The data used in the lower
panel of Figure 4 come from
the Union Bank of
Switzerland’s (UBS) 1994 edi-
tion of “Prices and Earnings
Around the Globe.”  The UBS
prices are based on a Big Mac
or similar hamburger price and
include a large order of french
fries.
17One exception may be the dol-
lar/yen exchange rate.
Marston (1987) ﬁnds that
deviations from PPP in the dol-
lar/yen exchange rate appear
to be related to a relatively
high growth rate of productivity
in the Japanese traded-goods
sector.
18Examples of studies that illus-
trate the failure of the law of
one price include Ceglowski
(1994) and Giovannini
(1988).  Engel and Rogers
(1995) study the law of one
price both within and across
countries.  They argue that dis-
tance between cities is the pri-
mary factor responsible for
price deviations within a coun-
try but not across countries.
Speciﬁcally, two nearby cities
that are separated by an
international border will exhibit
much greater disparity in goods
prices than two comparably dis-
tant cities not separated by an
international border.
19Feenstra and Kendall (1994)
ﬁnd that incomplete pass-
through is a signiﬁcant source
of deviations from PPP in the
post-1973 period.
20See, for example, Krugman
(1987).
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14components are easily resold.  Thus it
would be fairly easy for someone to purchase
the ingredients necessary to create a Big Mac
and sell a competing sandwich.  Though in
some markets, most notably the United
States, the Big Mac has close substitutes, 
in many countries the Big Mac has few
substitutes.  Perhaps this is because a Big
Mac is more than the sum of its ingredients.
In Russia, for example, the price of a meal
at a McDonald’s is costly relative to other
restaurants.  However, the quality of the food
is considered far superior to that offered in
most other restaurants frequented by the
average Russian. In addition, the food itself
is only part of the attraction.  People choose
to frequent McDonald’s for more than the
burgers, and these factors may be reﬂected
in price differences across borders.  The
courteous, efﬁcient service attracts many
patrons, as does the cleanliness of the
restaurant.  At the opening of the ﬁrst
McDonald’s in China, many patrons 
“commented on the novelty of restaurant
employees who are enthusiastic rather than
surly.”21 Even in the United States, where
there is a plethora of McDonald’s-type
restaurants, the availability of Playlands
(areas with playground equipment for
children) at many McDonald’s makes the
restaurant more attractive than its competi-
tors to parents of young children.
Looking at the data for Big Mac prices
in Japan and in the United States, we can
find some evidence that might be interpreted
as supportive of pricing-to-market behavior.
Between 1993 and 1995 the dollar fell by
25 percent against the yen.  Because McDon-
ald’s in Japan imports the beef—the most
costly ingredient that goes into the Big
Mac—a decline in the value of the dollar
should have reduced the yen price of a 
Big Mac.  Figure 5 compares the actual yen
price of the Big Mac with a hypothetical
price path that takes account of exchange
rate changes since 1988.  Although the yen
price of a Big Mac rose slightly after the dollar
appreciated during the late 1980s, it has
remained constant at 391 yen during the
sharp decline of the dollar during the 1990s.
Thus there is little evidence of pass-through.
On the other hand, in October 1995
McDonald’s Co. (Japan) Ltd. announced
that it was lowering the price of a Big 
Mac by more than 100 yen, a reduction 
of more than 25 percent.22 This brought
the price of a Big Mac roughly in line with
the exchange rate change over the past
three years.  However, though the price
change reduced the overvaluation of the
yen as calculated using the Big Mac index,
it did not completely eliminate this
overvaluation.  The new PPP level of the
exchange rate, approximately 120
yen/dollar, was still above the actual
yen/dollar exchange rate.
Current Account Imbalances
Another reason that exchange rate-
adjusted prices might differ across countries
is that exchange rates reﬂect international
trade not only in goods and services, but
also in ﬁnancial assets.  The PPP-based
approach to evaluating exchange rates
only considers the role of international
commodity trade; however, trade in assets
is arguably just as important (if not more
important) in determining supply and
demand for currencies.  Cross-country
asset ﬂows are, in turn, closely related to
positions of trade balance and imbalance
among nations.  
The broadest measure of a country’s
trade position is the current account, which
measures international ﬂows of goods, 
21Kristof (1992).
22The Economist, October 21,
1995, p. 77.
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Japanese Yenservices, investment income, and unilateral
transfers.  On a fundamental level, a country
that has a current account deﬁcit is attracting
capital from the rest of the world.  That is,
a country that is purchasing more abroad
than it is selling abroad must ﬁnance the
difference by borrowing.  Similarly, a
country with a current account surplus—
that is, a country exporting more goods
and services than it is importing—will
necessarily be investing abroad.23
Current account imbalances can 
therefore be thought of as reﬂecting
discrepancies between domestic investment
and savings.  As these imbalances generate
demand and supply changes for assets
denominated in various currencies,
exchange rates might deviate signiﬁcantly
from PPP .  Various theories of the relation-
ship between the current account and
exchange rate movements predict different
relationships between these two variables.
In fact, researchers have generally failed 
to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship—either
positive or negative—between the two.24
In a recent issue of The Economist, a
chart like that shown in the left panel of
Figure 6 was used to illustrate a supposedly
strong positive relationship between Big
Mac-based PPPs and current account 
balances.25 Using 1994 data, each of the
countries whose currencies are overvalued
relative to the dollar have current account
surpluses or smaller deﬁcits than the
United States.  Similarly, the two countries
that have undervalued currencies each
have larger current account deﬁcits 
than the United States.
However, this relationship does 
not hold generally.  The right panel of
Figure 6 shows the same comparison 
for 1992, with no apparent relationship
between Big Mac PPPs and current
account balances.  In particular, the
majority of countries with larger deﬁcits
than the U.S. deﬁcit appear to have curren-
cies that were overvalued relative to the
dollar in 1992.  Although current account
surpluses and deﬁcits can conceivably
cause exchange rates to deviate from 
their PPP values, it is difﬁcult to conclude
much about the direction or magnitude 
of the effect.
CONCLUSION 
Although the theory of PPP serves as a
useful benchmark for thinking about long-
term equilibrium in foreign exchange
markets, it generally does poorly as a pre-
23The relationship between capi-
tal ﬂows and current account
balances is reﬂected in the
notion of a country’s capital
account, which measures
inﬂows and outﬂows of assets.
As an accounting identity, a cur-
rent account deﬁcit is offset by
a capital account surplus.
24See, for example, Rose
(1991).
25The Economist, August 26,
1995. Figure 6 contains only
industrial countries to abstract
from PPP differences caused by
the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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+dictive tool.  A great deal of research effort
has been put into tests of PPP and in con-
structing price measures for consistent
bundles of commodities across countries.
It is interesting to ﬁnd that the simple col-
lection of items comprising the Big Mac
sandwich does just as well (or just as
poorly) at demonstrating the principles
and pitfalls of PPP as do more sophis-
ticated measures.
This is perhaps not surprising when
we consider that the Big Mac is a composite
of tradable commodities and non-tradable
service content.  Its ingredients are subject
to various tariffs and nontariff trade barriers
in countries around the world.  Finally,
though it may have close rivals in some
markets, the Big Mac itself is produced by
only one company; hence we might expect
to ﬁnd elements of imperfect competition.  
That many of its basic ingredients are
tradable goods would lead us to believe
that Big Mac prices around the world should
be driven to equality by arbitrage.  Its other
characteristics make the Big Mac a good
example of why the theory of PPP generally
fails to hold except under special circum-
stances.
REFERENCES
Balassa, Bela. “The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,”
Journal of Political Economy (December 1964), pp. 584-96.
Cassel, Gustav. The World’s Monetary Problems. Constable and
Company, Ltd., 1921.
Ceglowski, Janet.  “The Law of One Price Revisited: New Evidence on
the Behavior of International Prices,” Economic Inquiry (July 1994),
pp. 407-18.
Cumby, Robert E. “Forecasting Exchange Rates and Relative Prices With
the Hamburger Standard: Is What You Want What You Get With
McParity?”  Manuscript. Georgetown University, July 1995.
Curtius, Mary.  “Billions Served—But Not Orthodox Jews of Jerusalem,”
Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1995.
Driver, Nick. “A Cultural Revolution in Beijing, via Golden Arches,” 
Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1992.
Engel, Charles, and John H. Rogers.  “How Wide is the Border?”  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International
Finance Discussion Papers, No. 498, February 1995.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Jon D. Kendall.  “Pass-Through of Exchange
Rates and Purchasing Power Parity,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper, No. 4842, August 1994.
Giovannini, Alberto.  “Exchange Rates and Traded Goods Prices,” Journal
of International Economics (February 1988), pp. 45-68.
Kravis, Irving B., and Robert E. Lipsey. “National Price Levels and the
Prices of Tradables and Nontradables,”  The American Economic
Review (May 1988), pp. 474-78.
_______ and _______.  “The Assessment of National 
Price Levels,” in Sven W. Arndt and J. David Richardson, eds., 
Real-Financial Linkages among Open Economies.  MIT Press, 1987,
pp. 97-134.
Kristof, Nicholas D.  “Billions Served (and That Was Without China),”
The New York Times, April 23, 1992.
Krugman, Paul R.  “Pricing to Market when the Exchange Rate Changes,”
in Sven W. Arndt and J. David Richardson, eds., Real-Financial
Linkages among Open Economies. MIT Press, 1987, pp. 49-70.
Marston, Richard C.  “Real Exchange Rates and Productivity Growth in
the United States and Japan,” in Sven W. Arndt and J. David
Richardson, eds., Real-Financial Linkages among Open Economies.
MIT Press, 1987, pp. 71-96.
Rogoff, Kenneth.  “What Remains of Purchasing Power Parity?” 
Federal Reserve System Board of Governors Working Paper, 
No. 2114, March 1995.
Rose, Andrew K.  “The Role of Exchange Rates in a Popular Model of
International Trade: Does the ‘Marshall-Lerner’ Condition Hold?”
Journal of International Economics (May 1991), pp. 301-16.
Samuelson, Paul A. “Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems,” Review 
of Economics and Statistics (May 1964), pp. 145-64.
Sapsford, Jathon.  “Is the Big Mac a Mere Cheeseburger Or a Benchmark
for Currencies?” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1993.
Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston.  “The Penn World Table (Mark 5):
An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1991), pp. 327-68.
The Economist, various issues, 1986-1995.
Union Bank of Switzerland. Prices and Earnings Around the Globe: 
1994 Edition.  Union Bank of Switzerland, 1994.
Wei, Shang-Jin, and David C. Parsley. “Purchasing Power Dis-Parity
During the Floating Rate Period: Exchange Rate Volatility, Trade
Barriers and other Culprits.” Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors Working Paper, No. 2141, 1995.
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1996
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
17JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1996
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
18
TABLE A1
Table A1 reports measures of Big Mac
PPP against the U.S. dollar for all of the
countries surveyed by The Economist over
the years.  The numbers are constructed as
[(1/e) 3 (P*/P$)] 3 100.  A value  greater
than 100 means that dollar-equivalent
prices in the country under consideration
are higher than prices in the United States.   
For example, in 1995 it cost $2.32 to
buy a Big Mac in the United States and
$3.54 to buy a Big Mac in Sweden (after
conversion to dollars using the dollar/krona
exchange rate).  These prices indicate that
in terms of its purchasing power, the dollar
was worth 53 percent more (had a higher
value) in the United States than in Sweden.
Thus, relative to its PPP level, the dollar
was undervalued against the Swedish
krona and the krona was overvalued against
the dollar.  In 1995 it cost $1.58 to buy a
Big Mac in Hungary, a mere 68 percent of
the U.S. price.  In this case, the purchasing
power of the U.S. dollar was greater in
Hungary than in the United States.  Thus,
relative to its PPP level, the dollar was
overvalued against the Hungarian forint
and the forint was undervalued against 
the U.S. dollar.  
TABLE A2
The data in Table A2 are intended 
to be suggestive of whether relative 
PPP holds for Big Mac prices.  For each
country there are two rows of data.  The
ﬁrst row, inﬂation differential, presents data
corresponding to the right side of equation
3 (p.8).  For our purpose, the inﬂation dif-
ferential is the difference in price changes
for the Big Mac between each country
listed and the United States.  The next row,
change in exchange rate, presents data cor-
responding to the left side of equation 3.
For example, in 1992 it cost 108 francs to
buy a Big Mac in Belgium.  The price
increased to 109 francs in 1993, showing a
0.92 percent rate of inﬂation.  In the
United States it cost $2.19 to buy a Big
Mac in 1992 and $2.28 in 1993.  Big Mac
inﬂation was 4.03 percent in the United
States over this period.  Big Mac prices
rose by 3.11 percent less in Belgium than
in the United States.  Thus the inﬂation
differential was –3.11 percent.  The
Belgian franc/U.S. dollar exchange rate was
33.55 in 1992 and 32.45 in 1993.  The
change in the exchange rate was –3.33 per-
cent.  Because the exchange rate change was
approximately equal to the inﬂation differ-
ential, we can conclude that relative PPP
held for the Belgian franc/U.S. dollar
exchange rate during this period.  This is
reﬂected in the 1993 column in Table A2.
The Big Mac data indicate that relative
PPP generally did not hold on a year-to-
year basis.  This is not surprising given the
myriad factors that can inﬂuence the
exchange rate in the short run.  The last
column in Table A2 presents a simple test
of relative PPP using the Big Mac data over
a longer time.  This column calculates the
cumulative change in the exchange rate
and Big Mac inﬂation differentials for each
country relative to the dollar.  Using this
measure, relative PPP held for the
Hungarian forint and Irish punt relative to
the dollar.  For all other currencies, even
over a longer period, relative PPP fails to
hold.  Furthermore, for many countries,
contrary to what theory predicts,  the
exchange rate changes and the inﬂation
differentials moved in opposite directions.
For example, Big Mac inﬂation was 6 per-
cent less in Italy than in the United States
over the period 1987-95.  If relative PPP
held, the Italian lira should have appreci-
ated by 6 percent against the U.S. dollar
during this period.  In actuality, the lira
depreciated by 24 percent against the
dollar.  Thus there was a 30 percent real
depreciation of the lira against the dollar. 
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995
Argentina NA* NA NA NA NA NA 152 158 157 129
Australia 67 NA 60 84 79 86 89 77 75 78
Austria NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 123 173
Belgium 134 144 108 113 127 129 147 147 135 165
Brazil NA NA NA NA NA NA 81 123 69 116
Britain 103 104 92 106 104 133 139 122 116 121
Canada 85 NA 69 89 86 91 106 96 89 86
Chile NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 104
China NA NA NA NA NA NA 53 66 45 45
Czech. Rep. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 73 82
Denmark NA 187 150 167 181 185 197 186 167 212
France 154 173 129 138 143 142 149 152 138 166
Germany 131 136 103 113 116 114 125 128 117 150
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 107 NA
Hong Kong 61 NA 41 48 50 51 53 51 52 53
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA 68 76 78 71 68
Indonesia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 75
Ireland 100 106 82 91 94 100 109 100 NA NA
Israel NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 130
Italy NA 154 112 118 144 129 152 130 121 114
Japan 150 NA 125 138 106 125 130 152 163 200
Malaysia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 57 61 65
Mexico NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 105 74
Netherlands 119 132 109 119 127 124 133 135 124 152
New Zealand NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 84
Poland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 63
Portugal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 110 NA
Russia NA NA NA NA 284 255 27 50 71 70
Singapore 81 NA 59 71 63 70 131 NA 83 91
Spain 122 NA 107 118 127 151 141 125 109 123
Sweden 150 NA 131 162 179 191 196 151 139 153
Switzerland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 172 172 225
S. Korea NA NA NA 178 135 129 135 127 123 129
Taiwan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 102 109
Thailand NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 84 82 84
Venezuela NA NA NA NA NA NA 128 NA NA NA
Yugoslavia NA NA 69 38 62 94 NA NA NA NA
* NA indicates data are not avalable.
Note:  A number less than 100 indicates that the local currency is undervalued relative to the U.S. dollar on a PPP basis.
A number greater than 100 indicates that the local currency is overvalued relative to the U.S. dollar on a PPP basis.
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 Cumulative
Argentina
Inﬂation differential NA* NA NA NA NA NA 5% –1% –19% –15%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA 1% 0% 0% 1%
Australia
Inﬂation differential NA NA 24% 1% 4% 6% –8% –1% –1% 26%
Change in exchange rate NA NA –9% 6% –4% 3% 6% 2% –5% –1%
Austria
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 13% 13%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –21% –21%
Belgium
Inﬂation differential 0% –40% 17% –1% 1% 10% –3% –1% –1% –18%
Change in exchange rate –7% –12% 13% –13% –0% –3% –3% 8% –21% –39%
Brazil
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA 297% –395% –644% –742%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA 255% –337% –696% –778%
Britian
Inﬂation differential 3% –35% 23% 2% 15% 7% –1% 0% –5% 9%
Change in exchange rate 1% –23% 9% 3% –9% 2% 12% 7% –10% –8%
Canada
Inﬂation differential NA NA 22% –7% 5% 19% –4% 3% –4% 33%
Change in exchange rate NA NA –4% –3% –1% 3% 6% 10% 0% 11%
Chile
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –1% –1%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –5% –5%
China
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA 26% 5% –1% 30%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA 4% 43% –2% 45%
Czech Republic
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –1% –1%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –13% –13%
Denmark
Inﬂation differential NA –34% 25% –6% 3% 5% –10% –1% 3% –15%
Change in exchange rate NA –12% 14% –14% 0% –2% –4% 10% –21% –28%
France
Inﬂation differential 6% –41% 19% –9% –1% 3% –2% –1% –1% –25%
Change in exchange rate –5% –11% 12% –12% 0% –2% –4% 9% –19% –33%
Germany
Inﬂation differential –4% –40% 22% –9% –2% 7% –2% –1% 3% –25%
Change in exchange rate –7% –13% 13% –12% –1% –2% –4% 8% –21% –38%
Hong Kong
Inﬂation differential NA NA 17% 4% 1% 3% –3% 1% 2% 25%
Change in exchange rate NA NA –0% 0% 0% –1% 0% 0% 0% –1%
Hungary
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA 17% 13% 6% 11% 48%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA 6% 10% 16% 16% 48%
Ireland
Inﬂation differential 0% –37% 23% –9% 5% 6% –2% NA NA –13%
Change in exchange rate –6% –12% 14% –12% –2% –2% 6% NA NA –13%
Table A2
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 Cumulative
Italy
Inﬂation differential NA* –40% 17% 8% –10% 16% 5% 0% –2% –6%
Change in exchange rate NA –9% 12% –12% 1% –0% 21% 7% 4% 24%
Japan
Inﬂation differential NA NA 17% –9% 0% 3% –1% –1% –1% 8%
Change in exchange rate NA NA 7% 18% –16% –1% –16% –8% –21% –39%
Malaysia
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 11% –1% 10%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4% –8% –4%
Mexico
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 12% 29% 41%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 8% 64% 72%
Netherlands
Inﬂation differential 3% –33% 22% –6% –2% 5% –2% –1% –1% –15%
Change in exchange rate –7% –14% 14% –12% 0% –2% –4% 8% –21% –39%
Poland
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –913% –913%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –917% –917%
Russia
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA 96% 178% 256% 130% 102% 762%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA 106% 404% 194% 95% 103% 903%
Singapore
Inﬂation differential NA NA 17% –16% 5% 56% NA NA –2% 60%
Change in exchange rate NA NA –2% –4% –6% –7% NA NA –11% –31%
South Korea
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA –22% –2% 12% –4% –1% –1% –18%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA 6% 2% 8% 2% 2% –5% 14%
Spain
Inﬂation differential NA NA 15% –3% 15% –8% –1% 5% 2% 25%
Change in exchange rate NA NA 5% –10% –3% –1% 11% 19% –11% 11%
Sweden
Inﬂation differential NA NA 29% 5% 6% 1% –4% –1% 1% 37%
Change in exchange rate NA NA 8% –5% –1% –2% 23% 7% –8% 22%
Switzerland
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –1% 3% 2%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –1% –24% –25%
Taiwan
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4% 4%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –3% –3%
Thailand
Inﬂation differential NA NA NA NA NA NA NA –1% –1% –2%
Change in exchange rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1% –3% –2%
Yugoslavia
Inﬂation differential NA NA 128% –617% 67% NA NA NA NA –421%
Change in exchange rate NA NA 186% –664% 25% NA NA NA NA –453%
* NA indicates data are not available.
Table A2 (continued)
Relative Big Mac Purchasing Power Parity